Effect of free media on views regarding the safety of nuclear energy after the 2011 disasters in Japan: evidence using cross-country data by Yamamura, Eiji
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Effect of free media on views regarding
the safety of nuclear energy after the
2011 disasters in Japan: evidence using
cross-country data
Eiji Yamamura
28 June 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32011/
MPRA Paper No. 32011, posted 4 July 2011 18:15 UTC
1 
 
Effect of free media on views regarding the safety of 
nuclear energy after the 2011 disasters in Japan: 
evidence using cross-country data  
 
Eiji Yamamura

 
Department of Economics, Seinan Gakuin University, 
6-2-92 Sawara-ku, Nishijin, Fukuoka 814-8511, Japan 
 
SUMMARY  
 
Using cross-country data, this paper investigates how governance influenced 
views regarding the security of nuclear energy after the 2011 disasters in Japan. Key 
findings are: (1) citizens are less likely to agree that nuclear power plants are properly 
secured against accidents with the presence of a free media and higher levels of freedom 
of expression; and (2) freedom of expression and free media are positively associated 
with the presence of nuclear plants. These findings indicate that sufficient information 
leads citizens to both understand the risk of nuclear energy and to accept the existence 
of nuclear plants. 
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I.INTRODUCTION 
 
Japan was struck by one of the largest earthquakes in recorded history on 
March 11, 2011. Following the earthquake, a devastating tsunami arrived at the 
northeastern coast of Japan. The combination of earthquake and tsunami resulted in 
catastrophic damage. Hammer (2011, p. 28) states ‘As many as 18,000 people were 
killed. Hundreds of thousands remain homeless. Estimates vary, but the World Bank 
and Japanese government say that there’s somewhere between $122 billion and $235 
billion worth of damage to clean up.’ The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plants, located on 
the Fukushima coast (northeastern Japan), were crippled by the disasters, causing 
Japanese citizens to confront the danger of nuclear leakage.  
Nuclear leakage appears to be caused not only by natural disasters but also 
human error as explained below. The electricity market in Japan is considerably 
concentrated; a few incumbent companies enjoy a large share of the market. Hence, 
electricity companies such as the Tokyo Electric Power Co have significant market 
power and so gain larger profits than in a competitive market. Such market power is 
evident in the fact that Tokyo Electric Power Co, which operates the Fukushima nuclear 
plants, ignored warnings that the reactors were vulnerable. In a competitive market, 
competition would induce electricity companies to consider such warnings and improve 
the security of the nuclear plants. Furthermore, Tabuchi et al. (2011) reported ‘Just a 
month before a powerful earthquake and tsunami crippled the plant … government 
regulators provide a 10-year extension for the oldest of the six reactors at the power 
station despite warnings about its safety.’ Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, Yukio Edano, 
defended the government regulators and the Tokyo Electric Power by saying that ‘at 
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least, they were fully prepared for emergency situations based on the natural disaster 
information for the last 100 years or so.’ The nuclear disaster rating for Japan’s nuclear 
accident has since been upgraded from level 5 to level 7, a level reached only once before 
in the Chernobyl disaster (Tabuchi and Bradsher, 2011). The level of damage and loss 
caused by the nuclear accident appear to have increased as a result of confusing 
information provided by government. Bonanno (2011) states that the ‘problem is the 
growing mistrust of the government. The administration in Tokyo has consistently 
failed its people by providing confusing and often inaccurate information about the 
extent of the damage. They have also been frustratingly vague about the possible 
dangers of radiation contamination.’ The nuclear disaster in Japan has been 
characterized by Zeckhauser (1996, p. 115) as follows: ‘If the probabilities of catastrophe 
are not appropriately assessed and if those values are not disseminated and acted upon, 
we must expect poor outcomes.’  
The infamous Three Mile Island accident occurred in the United States on 
March 28, 1979, and is recognized as one of the most terrible nuclear disasters in history. 
The worst nuclear accident is considered to be the Chernobyl incident, which occurred 
on April 26, 1986 in the Ukraine. Since these two serious nuclear accidents, the security 
of nuclear energy has been at the fore of public attention. More recently, data regarding 
the long-term effect of the Chernobyl disaster has been accumulated, enabling the 
economic and political outcomes of the Chernobyl accident to be analyzed in the field of 
social science. Danzer and Weisshaar (2009) found that Ukrainian citizens whose family 
members were affected by the Chernobyl’s disaster are more likely to be unhappy. 
However, Chernobyl’s influence was not limited solely to the Ukraine; it also had a 
significant influence in other European countries. Almond et al. (2009) used data from 
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Sweden to present evidence that students born in regions exposed to higher levels of 
Chernobyl radiation fallout performed worse at secondary school. In Germany, people 
became more likely to worry about the environment after the Chernobyl disaster, even 
though the disaster did not reduce the life satisfaction of German citizens (Berger, 2010). 
Major disasters also influenced the outcomes of election and policy in the United States 
(Eisensee and Strӧmberg, 2007; Kahn, 2007). 
Japan’s nuclear disaster, which followed the earthquake and tsunami, is 
believed to affect citizens’ perceptions and views regarding the security of nuclear 
energy, not only in Japan but worldwide. For instance, Dempsey (2011) states ‘after the 
catastrophe in Japan, Mrs. Merkel reversed a pro-nuclear policy that she adopted just 
last year and temporary shut down seven of Germany’s 17 nuclear plants.’ Despite the 
change of pro-nuclear policy, Merkel’s conservative Christian Democrats suffered a 
major defeat in the election 2 weeks after the Japanese disaster. Switzerland has since 
announced a halt on the construction of new nuclear plants and the United States 
congress has called for hearings on nuclear safety. 
Zeckhauser (1996, p. 115) states, ‘if people merely worry about floods and can do 
nothing to prevent them or to reduce their costs, then it is best to alleviate their worries. 
However, underperception leads to inappropriate actions when preventive measures 
could be taken.’ Governance has a critical influence on media and in turn the 
information obtained by citizens. Free media has been allowed to flourish, contributing 
to greater political accountability and improving citizens’ perceptions. Under such 
conditions, politicians who are aware that voters are well-informed regarding 
politicians’ activities have a greater incentive to offer benefits to all citizens rather than 
just to small pressure groups (Besley and Burgess, 2002). The role of governance is 
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considered to be important and therefore requires investigation in situations when 
unexpected events, such as a natural or nuclear disaster, occur (Kahn, 2005; Escaleras 
et al., 2007). Quality of governance is believed to affect views regarding nuclear energy, 
and, therefore, citizens’ voting behavior, especially when nuclear disaster occurs. 
Hinman et al. (1993) used data from the 1990s to compare the perceptions of nuclear 
risks between Japan and United States. However, little is known regarding the effect of 
the quality of governance on perceptions and views concerning the security of nuclear 
energy. Catastrophe caused by natural and nuclear disasters often provokes controversy 
regarding nuclear energy, a topic that is currently very prominent worldwide. Thus, it is 
would be worthwhile and timely to investigate the association between institutional 
factors and citizens’ views regarding nuclear energy. To this end, using cross-country 
data collected after the 2011 Japan disaster, this paper attempts to examine how the 
governance of media influences views regarding the security of nuclear plants when 
natural disasters occur. The key finding is that citizens are more likely to understand 
the dangers of nuclear plants in countries where freedom of expression and a free media 
are assured to a greater degree. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section II surveys the related literature. 
Data and empirical strategy are explained in section III. The results of the estimations 
are reported in section IV. The final section presents my conclusions. 
 
II. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Over the years, there has been an increase in the level of academic attention paid 
to natural disasters. Recently, an increasing number of researchers have attempted to 
investigate the outcomes of natural disasters; for instance, the influence of disasters on 
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economic loss and deaths (e.g., Kahn, 2005, Escaleras et al., 2007; Toya and Skidmore, 
2007; Yamamura, 2010), economic growth (e.g., Skidmore and Toya, 2002; 
Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2008), and fiscal decentralization (Toya and Skidmore 2010).  
Both low income inequality and high-income leads to lower levels of damage 
caused by disasters (e.g., Anbarci et al., 2005; Kahn, 2005).1 However, Japan suffered 
significant damage in the 2011 disaster, despite high-income levels and relatively low 
economic inequality. As well as economic condition, disaster prevention measures are 
important to reduce the level of damage sustained in a disaster. Escaleras and Register 
(2007) suggest that early warning tsunami systems contribute to reduce tsunami deaths. 
This system is employed in tsunami prone areas such as Japan. However, a large 
number of citizens were killed by the tsunami in the 2011 disaster in Japan. Thus, other 
factors also appear to be determinants of disaster damage. 
Higher levels of education, a more comprehensive financial system, and a 
smaller economic government result in a smaller disaster death rate (Toya and 
Skidmore, 2007). Yamamura (2010) used Japanese panel data to find that social capital 
enhances the learning effect of a disaster experience, thus, reducing the level of damage 
from a disaster. From a public choice viewpoint, researchers have pointed out a number 
of problems stemming from massive government failures to cope with the risk of 
disaster (e.g., Congleton, 2006; Shughart II, 2006; Sobel and Leeson, 2006). For instance, 
there is no incentive for the public sector to request disaster relief resources greater 
than those that meet base requirements, even though accurate information regarding 
demand and supply is provided. As a consequence, efficient resource allocation cannot 
                                                   
1 Kellenberg and Mobarak (2008) asserted that the association between income level 
and damage levels from a disaster is non-linear. Disaster risk increases with income up 
to a certain level and decreases thereafter. 
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be realized. Political and institutional factors are, however, considered to play an 
important role when unexpected events occur. Kahn (2005) proposed the hypothesis 
that institutional quality insulates against death when natural disasters occur and 
found that the death rate is lower in disasters where democracy and good governance 
are practiced. Escaleras et al. (2007) used panel data from 1975 to 2003 establish that a 
less corrupt public sector leads to lower death rates from natural disasters. As well as 
formal institutions, unwritten social norms also play a key role in saving the lives of 
females and children before males and adults, as in the Titanic disaster (Frey et al., 
2009). 
In addition, the effect of natural disasters is examined from a psychological 
viewpoint in the field of social science. Researchers investigated how natural disasters 
affected life satisfaction (Luechinger and Raschkly, 2009; Carroll et al., 2009). 
Luechinger and Raschkly (2009) attempted to use the degree of life satisfaction to 
measure damage caused by floods in European countries from 1973 to 1998. Statistical 
analysis showed that floods had a detrimental effect on life satisfaction. Similarly, as 
with European countries, Carroll et al. (2009) found, using fixed-effect models with data 
from 2001 to 2004, that droughts also have a detrimental impact on life satisfaction in 
rural areas in Australia. Daly and Wilson (2009), using data from the United States, 
argued that the determinants of well-being were the same as the determinants for 
suicide. Furthermore, Chuang and Huang (2007) found that the number of suicides 
increased as an outcome of natural disasters, which is consistent with the finding of the 
works above (Chuang and Huang, 2007). 
Chernobyl is considered to be the most devastating nuclear disaster to have 
long-term detrimental effects on health status, and, in turn, on the performance of the 
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labor market in the Ukraine (Lehmann and Wadsworth, 2008). With regard to the 
degree of happiness, data regarding Ukrainian citizens whose family members suffered 
in the Chernobyl disaster has shown that they are more inclined to feel unhappy 
(Danzer and Weisshaar, 2009). The impact of Chernobyl has not been limited to the 
Ukraine. In Germany, the Chernobyl disaster changed views regarding environmental 
issue, although the disaster did not affect life satisfaction (Berger, 2010). In Sweden, 
human capital accumulation varied according to the degree of Chernobyl fallout 
experienced in various regions (Almond et al., 2009). 
Kanno et al. (2006) developed a computational model to simulate residents’ 
responses to nuclear disaster. They argued that it is important in a nuclear disaster to 
consider the decision-making process ‘because ordinary people cannot perceive the 
dangers and progress of an accident directly from the environment, and their decisions 
and responses can be greatly influenced by the secondary information provided by mass 
media, governmental agencies, or other people.’ Furthermore, the mass media and its 
information have an impact on government policy concerning disasters. Empirical work 
analyzing the influence of mass media on United States’ government relief to disasters 
has found that relief decisions are driven by the news coverage of such disasters 
(Eisensee and Strӧmberg, 2007). 
Low probability events such as natural and nuclear disasters are unlikely to 
draw much attention from citizens. However, once the events occur, citizens turn much 
of their attention to the issues surrounding such occurrences (Kurtz, 2004). Experience 
of disasters changes citizens’ perceptions, resulting in security measures becoming a 
key issue for citizens (Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2006). Japan’s nuclear disaster has had a 
definite influence on the election in Germany, resulting in a victory for the Green Party, 
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which opposes pro-nuclear policy. Unexpected events, such as Chernobyl and the Three 
Mile Island accident, appear to affect voting behavior. Kahn (2007) examined the impact 
of five major disasters2 on voting behavior and provided evidence that after a disaster 
liberal representatives were likely to receive more votes in favor of risk regulation. A 
comparative work by Hinman et al. (1993) showed a similarity between Japanese and 
Americans, in that both Japanese and Americans fear nuclear risks and generally feel 
they have little personal control over avoiding death caused by nuclear accident. 
However, there are also differences between the two nations: Americans are likely to 
believe that they have little knowledge of nuclear risk while Japanese tend to believe 
that they are very knowledgeable on the subject. In contrast to this finding, the 2011 
Japanese disaster revealed that Japanese were not sufficiently informed regarding the 
predicted damage from nuclear accidents. 
 
 
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
WIN-Gallup International (2011) conducted a survey regarding nuclear energy 
approximately 2 weeks after Japan’s natural disaster. Thirty-seven countries were 
asked ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree that nuclear power plants in your 
country (or near countries) are properly secured against accidents?’ There were five 
response options: ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’, and 
‘strongly disagree’. Response rates from each county are available from WIN-Gallup 
International (2011). Table A1 in the Appendix show surveyed countries. The World 
Bank conducted a World Governance Indicators (WGI) project and provided the 
                                                   
2 The five disasters were Three Mile Island, Love Canal, Bhopal, Chernobyl, and the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill. 
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governance indicator of ‘Voice and Accountability’.3 Kaufmann et al. (2010 p. 4) state 
that ‘Voice and Accountability’ captures the ‘perceptions of the extent to which a 
country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.’ The value of ‘Voice and 
Accountability’ becomes larger as the country's citizens are more able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media. 
Table 1 shows the definitions of the variables used in this paper, and their mean 
differences between countries with nuclear plants and those without. SECR1 and 
SECR2 for countries with nuclear plants are significantly larger than those without 
nuclear plants. I interpret this result as suggesting that the citizens who live in 
countries with nuclear plants are more likely to believe nuclear energy to be secure and 
hence support pro-nuclear policy. GOVEN for countries with nuclear plants is larger 
than those without it and its difference is statistically significant. This leads me to 
argue that citizens who obtain appropriate levels of information regarding nuclear 
energy via the media are more inclined to support nuclear energy. 
The relationship between the governance of media and views regarding security 
(SECR1) is illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows that the governance of media is 
negatively related to views regarding security. China is, however, considered an outlier 
because 80% citizens in China agree that nuclear energy is properly secured, which is a 
significantly greater percentage than in other countries. Hence, for a robustness check 
of Figure 1, I also present Figure 2, which demonstrates the relationship after the 
exclusion of the outlier (China). The negative relationship continues to be observed in 
                                                   
3 Data is available from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed 
April 28, 2011). 
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Figure 2. Therefore, the negative relationship is not a result of the inclusion of the 
outlier. However, Figures 1 and 2 do not indicate causality and as such I will examine 
causality using regression estimations later in the paper. The estimated function of the 
regression analysis takes the following form: 
SECR1(SECR2)i = 0 + 1NUCLEi + 2GOVENi + 3NDISi + 4GDPi + 5GOVSIZi 
 + 6EASIAi + uit,  
where SECR1 represents the rate of those strongly agreeing that nuclear plants are 
secured in country i. In the alternative specification, SECR2 is used as the dependent 
variable.  represents regression parameters and u is an error term. NUCLE is the 
dummy variable for the presence of nuclear plants. As explained earlier, GOVEN is the 
key variable to capture the degree of governance regarding media. Citizens can form an 
appropriate view regarding the security of nuclear power if freedom of media enables 
citizens to obtain sufficient information. If the government tends to conceal negative 
information regarding the security of nuclear energy, freedom of media leads citizens to 
believe that nuclear energy is not properly secured. Hence, GOVEN is anticipated to 
take the negative sign. NDIS is incorporated to control for the experience of natural 
disasters because experience influences perceptions regarding accidents caused by 
natural disasters (Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2006). Economic factors are controlled by the 
inclusion of GDP and GOVSIZ. The location of countries appears to be related with the 
change in perceptions caused by the Japan disaster. Neighboring countries to Japan, 
such as Korea and China, are more likely to be affected by the Japanese accident. For 
the purpose of capturing this effect, EASIA is included. 
As mentioned earlier, the Japanese government provided confusing and 
inappropriate information regarding the 2011 nuclear disaster. As a result, citizens now 
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distrust the Japanese government and have criticized government policy concerning 
nuclear energy. Information asymmetry between government (or media) and citizens is 
thought to influence citizens’ views regarding the security of nuclear energy, especially 
when unexpected nuclear incidents occur. ‘Voice and Accountability’ is used as a proxy 
in this study for the degree of information symmetry between government and citizens 
in each country.4  
As seen in the mean differences of SECR1 and SECR2 in Table 1, nuclear energy 
is likely to exist when people consider nuclear energy to be secured. OLS estimation 
results are believed to suffer from endogeneity bias because reverse causality appears to 
exist between the dependent variable SECR1 (or SECR2) and the independent variable 
NUCLE. With the aim of controlling for this bias, I used instrumental variables to 
conduct 2SLS estimations. Sufficient land area is required to build nuclear energy 
plants. In addition, it is more difficult to find the space to build plants in more densely 
populated countries. Hence, population density, land area, and a log of population are 
used as instrumental variables for the 2SLS estimations. These variables were obtained 
from the World Development Indicators.5 
 
IV. RESULTS 
 
The OLS estimation results are reported in Tables 2(a) and (b). The second stage 
2SLS results appear in Tables 3(a) and (b). Table 4 presents the first stage results of the 
2SLS estimations. In each table, results using the full sample are reported in columns 
                                                   
4 Kahn (2005) used ‘Voice and accountability’ to examine how the quality of governance 
influences death rates in disasters.  
5 The data are available from HP of The World Bank 
http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do (accessed March 28, 2011). 
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(1)–(3), while results using the sample excluding the outlier (China) are in columns 
(4)–(6). There are a total of 37 observations, reduced to 36 when the outlier (China) is 
excluded. As the sample size is small the jackknife method was used to calculate the 
standard error to ensure that the results were not spurious. 
To follow is a discussion of the OLS estimations. Table 2(a) shows that NUCLE 
takes the positive sign and is statistically significant in all columns. After excluding the 
outlier, the absolute values of NUCLE are approximately 8.50, suggesting that SECR1 
for countries with nuclear plants is 8.50% larger than those without nuclear plants. 
GOVEN yields the negative sign and is statistically significant in all columns. Hence, 
freedom of media reduces the rate of citizens’ believing that nuclear energy is secure. 
The absolute values of GOVEN are 0.30 and 0.36 when the full sample is used, and 0.20 
and 0.21 when China is excluded from the sample. This means that an outlier such as 
China increases the effect of GOVEN on SECR1. The significant negative effect of 
GOVEN, however, continues to exist after removing the outlier effect. EASIA is not 
statistically significant in column (1), but produces a significant negative sign in column 
(4). This suggests citizens living in a neighboring country to Japan are less likely to 
agree that nuclear energy is secure when China is excluded. Other control variables 
were not statistically significant and they do not influence SECR1. I now turn to the 
results of Table2 (b), which shows a further index regarding the views of citizens 
(SECR2). With regard to NUCLE, and similar to the results of Table 2(a), a significant 
positive sign was observed in all estimations. Furthermore, NUCLE in Table 2(b) is 
more statistically significant than that in Table 2(a). With respect to GOVEN, a 
significant negative sign continues to be observed, which is similar to Table 2(a). 
Furthermore, absolute t-statistics range from 2.44 to 2.96, which is larger than those 
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shown in Table 2(a), where the range is 1.83 to 2.43. Other control variables do not 
become statistically significant, which is the same as exhibited in Table 2(a). On the 
whole, the results do not change when SECR2 is used as a dependent variable. 
Looking at the results of the 2SLS estimation shown in Tables 3(a) and (b), an 
over-identification test provided a method of testing for exogeneity in the instrumental 
variables. Test statistics are not significant in columns (1)–(6) and thus do not reject the 
null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error term. 
This suggests that the instrumental variables are valid. I see from Table 3(a) that, with 
the exception of column (1), the sign of NUCLE is statistically significant. Absolute 
values of NUCLE range from 10.0 to 11.4, which are larger than those in Table 2(a). 
GOVEN yields the negative sign and is statistically significant at the 5% level in all 
columns. Absolute values range from 0.24 to 0.36, which is almost the same as those in 
Table 2(a). Concerning the other control variables, and in line with Table 2(a), the 
results are not statistically significant. With respect to results using the alternative 
dependent variable (SECR2), Table 3(b) reveals that NUCLE and GOVEN yield positive 
and negative signs, respectively, in all columns. Furthermore, NUCLE and GOVEN are 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all estimations. Therefore, on the whole, the 
combined results from Tables 2(a), (b) and Tables 3(a) and (b) lead me to argue that the 
estimation results are robust when alternative specifications are used.6 
As is exhibited in Table 4, results of the first stage estimation show that ‘land 
                                                   
6 The World Bank constructed various measures of quality of governance such as 
‘regulatory quality’, ‘rule of law’, and ‘control of corruption’. In addition to ‘Voice and 
control’, Kahn (2005) used the other variables shown above as proxies for quality of 
governance, and found that these variables are negatively associated with deaths as a 
result of disasters. Following Kahn (2005), this paper also examined the effects of other 
proxy variables as above, regarding views on nuclear energy although the results were 
not reported. No significant effects were found. The results are available upon request 
from the author. 
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area’ and ‘population density’ take the positive and negative signs, in all columns, 
respectively, which is consistent with the proposition, although ‘population density’ is 
not statistically significant. Demand for electricity is increasing function of population 
size. The significant positive sign of Ln (population) is believed to reflect that a greater 
demand for electricity is a greater demand for nuclear energy. As with the results of the 
instrumental variables, it is also interesting to observe that GOVEN yields the positive 
sign and is statistically significant. Hence, freedom of media leads citizens to support 
the presence of nuclear energy. 
Hinman et al. (1993) states ‘reasons proposed for the strong feelings against 
nuclear technologies have ranged from irrationality and ignorance to thoughtful 
responses by concerned citizens to images of the horror … .’ Only after they have had 
access to the relevant information should citizens begin their decision-making process 
regarding nuclear policy. Furthermore, the cost of obtaining such information should be 
sufficiently low, enabling democracy to function well. That is, it is important to 
discourage citizens from becoming ‘rationally ignorant’ when concerning nuclear policy, 
because nuclear accidents have a tremendous effect on social and economic situations as 
shown in the catastrophic nuclear disasters of Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and 
Fukushima. I interpret the evidence presented above to mean that better governance of 
media decreases the consensus rates in a country (or nearby country) regarding the 
security of nuclear power plants against accidents. In contrast, better governance of 
media also increases the number of nuclear plants. This implies that pro-nuclear energy 
policy is supported when the benefit of nuclear energy outweighs its cost, even if 
citizens are unlikely to consider nuclear energy as fully secured against accidents. From 
this I derive the argument that the governance of media decreases information 
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asymmetry between government and citizens, and plays a critical role in enabling 
citizens to calculate the costs and benefits of nuclear energy.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Nuclear disaster, like the one that followed the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in 
Japan, results in tremendous economic loss as well as psychological damage. The degree 
of loss and damage caused by such disasters can be more severe because of market and 
government failures. A lack of competition in Japan’s electricity market reduced the 
incentive of electricity firms to monitor the security of their nuclear energy, and this 
resulted in higher levels of damage from the nuclear incident. Consequently, the nuclear 
disaster rating for Japan’s nuclear incidents reached level 7, equivalent to the rating 
given to the 1986 Chernobyl explosion. To make matters worse, the Japanese 
government provided confusing information concerning the damage caused by the 
nuclear incidents, causing much embarrassment to Japanese citizens, especially those 
who lived close to the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plants. The Japanese 
government attempted to regulate information regarding the accidents. Thus, Japanese 
citizens were not able to obtain useful and accurate information. Zeckhauser (1996, p. 
113) states ‘Catastrophes are produced through a combination of actions by nature and 
humans. Due to inappropriate incentives, human actions often exacerbate outcomes.’ 
How a country is to cope in a state of emergency, such as a nuclear disaster, is a 
very important issue. Japan’s example suggests the importance of governance regarding 
disaster information when a state of emergency arises. Furthermore, it is worth 
exploring how governance regarding information influences views and perceptions 
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concerning the security of nuclear energy against accidents. This study used 
cross-country data from 37 countries to examine how governance regarding ‘Voice and 
Accountability’ affected views on the security of nuclear energy after the 2011 disasters 
in Japan. After controlling for various factors and endogeneity bias, estimation results 
showed: (1) citizens are less likely to agree that nuclear power plants are properly 
secured against accidents when freedom of expression and a free media are assured to a 
greater degree; and (2) freedom of expression and free media are positively associated 
with the presence of nuclear plants.  
Greater freedom of expression and free media are believed to reduce information 
asymmetry between government and citizens. Hence, the findings of this study imply 
that information asymmetry has a critical influence on the presence of nuclear plants as 
well as perceptions regarding the security of nuclear energy against accidents. That is, 
the appropriate information enables citizens to understand more fully the risk of 
nuclear energy, whereas citizens accept the presence of nuclear plants when insufficient 
information has been provided. From this I derive the argument that governance 
regarding ‘Voice and Accountability’ enables citizens to calculate the benefits and costs 
of the presence of nuclear energy, and then properly make a decision regarding nuclear 
policy. 
The evidence presented in this paper is based on aggregate level data. Various 
individual-level characteristics are believed to influence the estimation results, with the 
estimation results appearing to suffer omitted variable bias. For a closer examination of 
the effect of serious nuclear incidents on views regarding nuclear energy, 
individual-level data are required. This outstanding issue needs to be addressed in 
future work.  
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Table 1  
Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
Note: Values in parentheses are absolute t-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
SECR1 and SECR2 are obtained from WIN-Gallup International (2011). GOVEN is obtained from 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed April 28, 2011). NUCLE is collected from HP of European Nuclear 
Society (http://www.euronuclear.org/info/npp-ww.htm (accessed April 30, 2011). GDP and GOVSIZ are sourced from Penn World Table 
6.3. http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php (accessed April 30, 2011). NDIS is obtained from the International Disaster 
Database http://www.emdat.be (accessed April 30, 2011).  
 
 Definition With nuclear plants Without nuclear plants. t-statistics 
SECR1 Rate of strongly agreeing that nuclear power plants in 
your country (or nearly country) are properly secured 
against accidents (%) 
15.1 7.6 1.80* 
SECR2 Rate of agreeing (or strongly agreeing) that nuclear 
power plants in your country (or nearly country) are 
properly secured against accidents (%) 
44.0 22.7 4.35*** 
NUCLE Country with nuclear energy takes 1, otherwise 0 --- --- --- 
GOVEN Indicator for governance, ‘Voice and Accountability’ of 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank) 
71.2 46.8 2.29** 
NDIS Total number of natural disasters since 1970 152.7 49.3 1.85* 
GDP 
 
GDP per capita (million dollars) 2.3 1.5 1.85* 
GOVSIZ 
 
Government expenditure of GDP (%) 15.8 16.9 0.37 
EASIA 
 
Dummies for East Asian countries (China and Korea). --- --- --- 
25 
 
Table 2(a)  
OLS estimation; dependent variable: SECR1 (rate of strongly agreeing with the security of nuclear power)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors obtained using the jackknife method. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Full sample            Excluding outlier (China)  
    (1)    (2)   (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
NUCLE 8.91*** 
(3.16) 
11.3** 
(2.37) 
11.3** 
(2.44) 
 8.77*** 
(3.90) 
8.42*** 
(3.80) 
8.48*** 
(4.04) 
GOVEN –0.30* 
(–1.83) 
–0.36* 
(–1.86) 
–0.36* 
(–2.02) 
 –0.20** 
(–2.29) 
–0.20** 
(–2.22) 
–0.21** 
(–2.43) 
NDIS 0.02 
(0.47) 
0.02 
(0.61) 
0.02 
(0.61) 
 –0.00001 
(–0.01) 
0.004 
(0.03) 
0.0003 
(0.03) 
GDP 
 
2.31 
(0.67) 
3.31 
(0.85) 
2.87 
(1.00) 
 1.13 
(0.63) 
1.10 
(0.59) 
1.36 
(1.00) 
GOVSIZ 
 
0.05 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
  –0.05 
(–0.21) 
–0.04 
(–0.17) 
 
EASIA 
 
19.5 
(0.44) 
   –4.51** 
(–2.20) 
  
Constant 
 
16.1* 
(1.75) 
17.9* 
(1.95) 
18.7*** 
(2.80) 
 16.6** 
(2.58) 
16.3** 
(2.51) 
15.4*** 
(3.79) 
Adjusted R2 0.55 0.47 0.48  0.28 0.29 0.31 
Observations 37 37 37   36 36 36 
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Table 2 (b)  
OLS estimation; dependent variable: SECR2 (rate of agreeing (or strongly agreeing) with the security of nuclear power)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors obtained using the jackknife method. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Full sample            Excluding outlier (China)  
    (1)    (2)   (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
NUCLE 27.1*** 
(5.84) 
28.3*** 
(5.17) 
28.5*** 
(5.37) 
 27.0*** 
(6.41) 
26.1*** 
(6.24) 
26.3*** 
(6.47) 
GOVEN –0.48** 
(–2.44) 
–0.51** 
(–2.54) 
–0.54*** 
(–2.91) 
 –0.40*** 
(–2.72) 
–0.39** 
(–2.61) 
–0.42*** 
(–2.96) 
NDIS –0.0001 
(–0.00) 
0.003 
(0.08) 
0.002 
(0.07) 
 –0.01 
(–1.03) 
–0.01 
(–0.97) 
–0.01 
(–0.96) 
GDP 
 
5.41 
(1.33) 
5.81 
(1.43) 
6.57** 
(2.20) 
 4.31 
(1.60) 
4.26 
(1.48) 
5.43** 
(2.70) 
GOVSIZ 
 
–0.14 
(–0.22) 
–0.14 
(–0.24) 
  –0.24 
(–0.57) 
–0.22 
(–0.46) 
 
EASIA 
 
9.78 
(0.24) 
   –11.8*** 
(–3.33) 
  
Constant 
 
39.8*** 
(3.28) 
40.7*** 
(3.44) 
38.0*** 
(5.27) 
 40.3*** 
(4.01) 
39.5*** 
(3.79) 
35.6*** 
(5.58) 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.52 0.53  0.45 0.45 0.45 
Observations 37 37 37   36 36 36 
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Table 3(a)  
2SLS estimation; dependent variable: SECR1 (rate of strongly agreeing with the security of nuclear power)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors obtained using the jackknife method. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Instrumental variables are land area, population density, and log 
of population in 2009. These variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators 2010 (CD-Rom version). 
 
 
             Full sample            Excluding outlier (China)  
    (1)    (2)   (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
NUCLE 10.0 
(1.46) 
10.7* 
(1.75) 
10.4* 
(1.74) 
 11.3* 
(1.95) 
11.1* 
(1.95) 
11.4** 
(2.21) 
GOVEN –0.31** 
(–2.10) 
–0.36** 
(–2.10) 
–0.35** 
(–2.29) 
 –0.23** 
(–2.18) 
–0.23** 
(–2.19) 
–0.24** 
(–2.50) 
NDIS 0.01 
(0.39) 
0.02 
(0.57) 
0.02 
(0.58) 
 –0.003 
(–0.20) 
–0.002 
(–0.18) 
–0.002 
(–0.20) 
GDP 
 
2.49 
(0.80) 
3.04 
(0.88) 
2.80 
(1.03) 
 1.43 
(0.81) 
1.42 
(0.80) 
1.65 
(1.27) 
GOVSIZ 
 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
  –0.05 
(–0.23) 
–0.04 
(–0.16) 
 
EASIA 
 
18.7 
(0.43) 
   –5.76* 
(–1.88) 
  
Constant 
 
16.3* 
(1.79) 
17.8* 
(1.90) 
18.6*** 
(2.80) 
 16.6** 
(2.58) 
16.5** 
(2.65) 
15.8*** 
(3.86) 
Over-identification 
(Sargan) 
Test 
1.48 
P-value=0.47 
1.28 
P-value=0.52 
1.31 
P-value=0.51 
 1.58 
P-value=0.21 
0.87 
P-value=0.64 
0.78 
P-value=0.67 
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.54 0.54  0.27 0.37 0.36 
Observations 37 37 37   36 36 36 
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Table 3(b)  
2SLS estimation; dependent variable: SECR2 (rate of agreeing (or strongly agreeing) with the security of nuclear power)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated by standard errors obtained by the jackknife method. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5 % and 1% levels, respectively.   Instrumental variables are land area, population density and log of 
population in 2009. These variables are obtained from World Development Indicators 2010 (CD-Rom version). 
 
 
             Full sample            Excluding outlier (China)  
    (1)    (2)   (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
NUCLE 28.4*** 
(4.06) 
28.5*** 
(3.87) 
29.3*** 
(3.93) 
 29.3*** 
(4.07) 
29.0*** 
(4.54) 
30.3*** 
(4.89) 
GOVEN –0.50*** 
(–2.85) 
–0.52*** 
(–2.82) 
–0.55*** 
(–3.23) 
 –0.43*** 
(–3.31) 
–0.42*** 
(–3.34) 
–0.47*** 
(–3.77) 
NDIS –0.001 
(–0.04) 
0.002 
(0.07) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
 –0.02 
(–1.04) 
–0.02 
(–1.07) 
–0.02 
(–1.15) 
GDP 
 
5.56 
(1.49) 
5.83 
(1.52) 
6.65** 
(2.39) 
 4.61* 
(1.89) 
4.61* 
(1.79) 
5.84*** 
(3.23) 
GOVSIZ 
 
–0.14 
(–0.23) 
–0.14 
(–0.24) 
  –0.24 
(–0.89) 
–0.21 
(–0.48) 
 
EASIA 
 
9.14 
(0.23) 
   –12.9*** 
(–3.13) 
  
Constant 
 
40.0*** 
(3.34) 
40.7* 
(3.42) 
38.1*** 
(5.30) 
 40.5*** 
(4.21) 
39.7*** 
(3.97) 
36.1*** 
(5.83) 
Over-identification 
(Sargan) 
Test 
0.05 
P-value=0.97 
0.04 
P-value=0.97 
0.03 
P-value=0.98 
 0.05 
P-value=0.97 
0.01 
P-value=0.99 
0.07 
P-value=0.96 
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.59 0.58  0.54 0.52 0.50 
Observations 37 37 37   36 36 36 
29 
 
Table 4  
First stage 2SLS estimations presented in Table 3(1) and Table 3(2); dependent variable: NUCLE (country with nuclear energy takes 1, 
otherwise 0)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Values in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors obtained using the jackknife method. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Instrumental variables are land area, population density, and log 
of population in 2009. These variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators 2010 (CD-Rom version). 
             Full sample            Excluding outlier (China)  
    (1)    (2)   (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
Land area 0.43* 
(1.87) 
0.40* 
(1.69) 
0.40* 
(1.75) 
 0.43* 
(1.82) 
0.43* 
(1.70) 
0.40* 
(1.76) 
Population density 
  
–0.005 
(–0.07) 
–0.01 
(–0.20) 
–0.01 
(–0.20) 
 –0.004 
(–0.06) 
–0.005 
(–0.08) 
–0.005 
(–0.08) 
Ln (population) 
 
0.12** 
(1.91) 
0.13** 
(2.00) 
0.12** 
(2.00) 
 0.12** 
(1.88) 
0.13** 
(2.05) 
0.13** 
(2.13) 
GOVEN 0.01*** 
(2.86) 
0.01** 
(2.54) 
0.01*** 
(2.75) 
 0.01*** 
(2.78) 
0.01*** 
(2.75) 
0.01*** 
(2.96) 
NDIS –0.0004 
(–0.57) 
–0.0001 
(–0.27) 
–0.0001 
(–0.23) 
 –0.0004 
(–0.58) 
–0.0005 
(–0.66) 
–0.0004 
(–0.66) 
GDP 
 
–0.07 
(–0.68) 
–0.05 
(–0.44) 
–0.06 
(–0.61) 
 –0.07 
(–0.68) 
–0.07 
(–0.61) 
–0.07 
(–0.76) 
GOVSIZ 
 
0.001 
(0.21) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
  0.001 
(0.19) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
 
EASIA 
 
0.48 
(1.56) 
   0.44 
(0.19) 
  
Constant 
 
–1.48** 
(–2.05) 
–1.53** 
(–2.06) 
–1.46** 
(–2.24) 
 –1.58** 
(–2.13) 
–1.58** 
(–2.13) 
–1.54** 
(–2.36) 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.38 0.40  0.39 0.39 0.38 
Observations 37 37 37   36  36 36 
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APPENDIX. List of countries used in the analysis 
With nuclear plants Without nuclear plants 
Belgium Austria 
Brazil Azerbaijan 
Bulgaria Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Canada Cameroon 
China Colombia 
Czech Egypt 
Finland Georgia 
France Greece 
Germany Hong Kong 
India Iceland 
South Korea Iraq 
Netherlands Italy 
Pakistan Kenya 
Romania Macedonia 
Russia Morocco 
South Africa Nigeria 
Spain Palestinian 
Switzerland Poland 
United States Serbia 
 Vietnam 
Note: Surveys were also conducted in Bangladesh, Fiji, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey. The question regarding the independent variable 
‘rate of thinking safety about nuclear energy’ was not asked in these countries. Hence 
these countries are not used in the analysis. Information regarding nuclear countries 
was collected from HP of European nuclear society 
(http://www.euronuclear.org/info/npp-ww.htm (accessed April 30, 2011). 
 
